The Department of Defense has invested in threat detection systems, consisting of sensors and algorithms to collect and process data on potential threats. We performed a Monte Carlo tradeoff analysis to determine the optimal combination of sensor versus algorithm capability for an airborne wide area motion imagery (WAMI) system used to identify insurgents detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in urban environments. We created a computational model of the WAMI system, including the camera and algorithms for processing, exploitation, and dissemination. We also synthesized input data consisting of objects and activities taking place in a city over two days. We compared the model's output versus input to quantify its overall value to the counter-IED mission. We exercised the model twice: forensically to identify insurgents after the IED explosions and prospectively to identify insurgents as early as possible beforehand. Although better sensors led to better intermediate results, they did not always lead to greater overall value. Once the number of true positives saturated at its best possible value, the number of false positives continued to grow as the quality of the sensor improved. Similar results may occur for other scenarios in which threats are limited in number with low prevalence.
1. Background
Sensors versus algorithms
The Department of Defense (DoD) has made large investments in sensor development for threat detection systems. Current acquisition costs alone are of the order of US$40 billion. 1 As a result, the DoD now possesses many datasets that are extremely large in size. For example, Defense Systems reported on a single unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that collects 10,000 inputs in 17 s. 2 In another example, a 2008 study by the JASON defense advisory group noted that ''. surveillance platforms such as the more recent Global Hawk system are capable of producing 10's to 100's of Terabytes [TB] over a period of hours. '' 3 These large datasets often sit untouched, since there are not enough human analysts to process the data. The JASON study quoted a senior DoD official as saying that ''70% of the data we collect is falling on the floor.'' 3 In 2011, GEN James Cartwright, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented on the personnel required to operate and analyze the data collected by the Predator, a UAV often used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. 4 ''It takes 19 analysts to run a Predator,'' he stated, ''We just started fielding sensors that can take a Predator and can move it to 64 simultaneous sharing points on the Earth. I can't stand that math. I don't have that many analysts.'' Software algorithms could automatically process these large datasets, exploit the information contained therein, and disseminate the right intelligence to the right user at the right time. Yet, software development has often challenged the DoD. System cost growth is often blamed on software problems and delays in software development often prevent systems from achieving their full functionality. For example, the Space Based InfraRed System (SBIRS) High had a cost growth of 175.8% over 11 years, which was primarily blamed on design-related software problems. 5 The DoD planned to launch SBIRS in September 2010; however, the ground control software was not scheduled to be fully functional until at least 2014. 6 Similar problems exist with ground station software for the latest Global Positioning System upgrades. 7 As the DoD admits, ''Software issues are significant contributors to poor program execution. '' 8 As budgets tighten across the government, the DoD may wish to identify in which areas current and future investments should be made. Should large investments continue in sensor development or, despite the challenges in developing software, should some resources be diverted toward algorithm development instead? Related questions include the following.
• How good does the sensor have to be to enable the processing algorithms? • Can a sensor be too good-that is, after a certain point, will users of the system no longer get a ''bang'' for their sensor ''buck''-in which case, should the DoD devote those ''bucks'' to algorithms instead?
A tradeoff analysis can help answer these and other related questions.
Forensic versus prospective investigations
Tradeoff analyses can be applied to threat detection systems used for forensic and prospective investigations. Recent examples of forensic investigations are the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and the 2015 attacks on Paris, in which authorities identified and apprehended alleged terrorists after the explosion of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 9, 10 In prospective investigations, however, authorities seek to identify suspects before the threat event in an effort to prevent the event from occurring. The combination of sensors and algorithms that can best comprise a threat detection system for forensic investigations may or may not be the same combination that can best support a prospective investigation. To investigate this issue, we performed a tradeoff analysis for one particular type of threat detection system to determine what combination of sensor and algorithm capabilities could provide the most overall value to the user for her mission. We compared and contrasted the results of our analysis from a forensic versus prospective point of view.
Tradeoff analysis
In this paper, we first discuss the methods used to perform our tradeoff analysis, including our selection of a scenario, our development of an end-to-end model of the threat detection system used in the scenario, our synthesis of fully ground-truthed input data to exercise our model, our querying of the model's output data, and our determination of metrics to describe the overall value of the system to the user for her mission. Then, we present the results of exercising the model from both a forensic and prospective point of view. Finally, we comment on the tradeoffs that system developers can choose to make when designing systems for primarily forensic versus primarily prospective threat detection.
Methods

Selecting the scenario
We selected our scenario due to its salience in overseas military campaigns in the 2000s. As illustrated in Figure 1 , an aircraft collects imagery over a city. Wide area motion imagery (WAMI) cameras collect high-resolution data over several square kilometers at once. 11 In some situations, ''soda straws'' of that imagery-high-resolution video cropped to cover only a small geographical regioncould be transmitted to military commanders and analysts in theater to guide warfighter tactics in real time. In other situations, the imagery could also be transmitted to reachback support (i.e., military analysts in the USA) to inform a more long-term strategy. This type of imagery has been used in forensic investigations of IED explosions in overseas urban theater. This imagery could also be useful in prospective analyses.
Creating the model
System developers often construct high-fidelity models of the WAMI cameras and low-level processing algorithms envisioned for our selected scenario. Rather than modeling a specific camera, one could instead model a generic WAMI camera system and vary the system's parameters. The top of Figure 2 illustrates a notional, complex model of the camera, the object and activity detection algorithms, and the tracking and image compression algorithms needed for our selected scenario. Less important to this paper is the text written in each individual box-it is the sheer number of boxes that is more relevant here.
Manipulating such a complex model is challenging and time consuming due to several factors: (1) the data output by the model can be very large and therefore difficult to manipulate; (2) different models of the same system may be based on different assumptions; and (3) models of individual components of the system cannot necessarily be linked together to form an end-to-end model of the system as a whole, making it difficult to analyze how information can and should flow from one component of the system to the next. To overcome these challenges, we created a simple, end-to-end model that abstracts all components of the threat detection system.
2.2.1
Modeling the developing components of the system. In our model, the WAMI camera and low-level processing algorithms (i.e., imagery collection, activity detection, and object tracking) have been abstracted into a single block, shown at the bottom of Figure 2 . This simplified model is based on a small number of key parameters that summarize the overall quality of the camera and low-level processing algorithms. These key parameters are described in Table 1 .
The simplicity of our model made it easy to work with. Because the camera and low-level processing algorithms were abstracted together into one single block, the imagery itself did not have to be modeled. This was beneficial because, at the time we began our analysis, the real-world camera was still under development and no examples of its imagery were available to us. Rather than first modeling this real-world imagery and then modeling the effects of the low-level processing algorithms on that modeled imagery, we simply modeled the overall effects of both the camera and low-level processing algorithms together.
That is, information describing the objects and activities taking place in a city scene were input into our model. For each activity of each object, the model determined whether the activity had been observed and detected by the camera system by generating random numbers and comparing those numbers against the key parameters defined in Table 1 . For motion activities, the tracking quality of the camera system was also taken into consideration. For example, an activity that consisted of an individual driving a vehicle along 1-km route could be observed, detected, and tracked by our model as a single 1-km long drive. In contrast, our model of a poorer quality camera system could, instead, report this activity as multiple, shorter drives, adjacent in time and location. The output of the model was a set of text reports describing the detected activities and tracked objects (i.e., vehicles). These detected activities and tracked objects may be similar to or different from the objects and activities included in the original scene, depending on the quality of the camera and low-level processing algorithms, as represented by the model's parameters.
The input and output text reports were much easier to manipulate than the imagery. For example, to represent 48 hr of WAMI, the complex model in the top of Figure 2 would have to generate approximately 520 TB of raw data, even assuming a 100:1 compression ratio (with a 10 km × 10 km area, 10 cm ground sample distance, 10 Hz frame rate, and 24 bits per pixel color depth). In contrast, with our simple model, 48 hr of detected activities and tracked objects could be represented by only 150 MB (0.00015 TB) of data, uncompressed.
2.2.2
Modeling the anticipated components of the system. The camera and low-level activity detection and object tracking components depicted at the bottom of Figure 2 were already under development at the time we began our analysis. Other components were anticipated for future versions of the system, including two high-level exploitation algorithms to reconstruct (1) the patterns of life and (2) the social networks of the tracked objects. These high-level algorithms were intended to exploit the information extracted from the earlier, more low-level activity detection and object tracking algorithms.
One of the anticipated algorithms modeled in our analysis learned the patterns of life of the tracked objects (e.g., individuals driving vehicles) over time. This algorithm used logical rules to assemble short text reports about tracked objects into longer sequences. Each sequence represented the activities and tracks of what the modeled system believed to be a distinct, unique individual. Two reports were sequenced together only if their content was consistent-that is, if both reports referred to tracked objects that appeared to be the same individual because the objects shared many similar characteristics (i.e., the same color, size, shape, and so forth). For objects that are vehicles, the ability to distinguish one vehicle from another was abstracted to a single model parameter, N color , described in Table 1 . Cameras with higher N color values can distinguish more vehicle types. Of course, objects can also be distinguished from each other due to simply time and location.
Other constraints were also imposed on the sequencing. For example, if one track report consisted of a red pickup truck driving into a parking garage and another track report consisted of a red pickup truck driving out of the same parking garage 1 hr later, then the two reports were sequenced together only if no other reports consisted of red pickup trucks entering or leaving that parking garage Figure 2 . Two models of a generic wide area motion imagery camera system. MB = megabyte, TB = terabyte hrs = hours, QC = quality control, CCD = charge-coupled device and MTI = moving target indicator.
within the intervening hour and no reports consisted of red pickup trucks inhabiting the parking garage at the beginning of that hour. Individual reports that could not be sequenced with other reports formed their own, one-report sequence.
Another anticipated algorithm built up a social network of the sequenced individuals (i.e., who is associated with whom). Our model of the social network algorithm was also based on a few of the key summary parameters listed in Table 1 . Two sequenced individuals were associated to the first degree if they were reported as inhabiting a certain number of locations at the same time. First-degree associations were represented by an N × N symmetric adjacency matrix, where N is the number of sequenced individuals. The i,jth and j,ith elements of the matrix were set to 1 if the ith and jth sequences were associated to the first degree and to 0 otherwise. Higher degree associations were then found by taking this matrix to a higher power. 12 For • Probability of tracking a vehicle through an obstruction (e.g., underpass or tree).
• A higher P tto represents a better trackingthrough-obstruction algorithm.
0-100% 100%
P track Developing Component (object tracking algorithm)
• Overall probability of tracking a vehicle.
• A higher P track represents a better overall tracking algorithm, accounting for track losses due to obstructions as well as to poor algorithm performance.
0-100% 90%
N loc Anticipated Component (social network algorithm)
• Number of coincident locations that two sequences of tracked individuals must share in order to be associated to the first degree. A coincident location is a location inhabited by two sequenced individuals at the same time.
• A higher N loc represents a stricter social network algorithm.
0 to the maximum number of locations in the input data 2 3 4 5
• Number of degrees of association sought in the social network. example, up to third-degree associations were found by taking the matrix to the third power.
2.2.3
Constructing an end-to-end model of the system. We connected together our models of the developing and anticipated components of the system, as shown in Figure  3 . The parameters of each block of the model are summarized in Table 1 . The Developing Components block outputs a set of text reports (shown in the middle of Figure 3 ) regarding those objects and activities taking place in the city scene that the camera and low-level processing algorithms were able to detect and track. Although these reports constituted a much smaller dataset than the hypothetical imagery would have, the reports still contained thousands to tens of thousands of tracks-too many tracks for a human analyst to process manually in a short amount of time. Therefore, these text reports were then input into the Anticipated Components block of our model, which automatically assembled the reports into sequences representing the activities and tracks of what the modeled system believed to be distinct, unique individuals, and then automatically built up a social network among the sequenced individuals. These anticipated algorithms output another set of reports (on the right in Figure 3 ) consisting of the associations between sequenced individuals (e.g., individuals and their likely family members/friends/coworkers) and between sequenced individuals and their surroundings (e.g., individuals and their likely places of residence/work/leisure/worship). This second set of reports could be more easily queried by a human analyst. The purpose of our analysis was to trade off the capabilities of the developing versus anticipated components of the threat detection system.
Synthesizing the input data
Data were needed to exercise our end-to-end model illustrated in Figure 3 . The design of our model eliminated the need for generating the imagery itself. Instead, all that we needed was information about the objects and activities that would have been captured in the hypothetical imagery. The input data needed to meet three requirements: (1) cover a large enough geographical area (several square kilometers) to mimic the expanse that the camera would cover in the real-world scenario illustrated in Figure 1 ; (2) cover a long enough duration (multiple days) to allow the high-level exploitation algorithms the opportunity to uncover the objects' patterns of life and associations; and (3) be fully ground-truthed for both the threat and nonthreat background clutter to score how well the intelligence queried from the output text reports could uncover the true objects, activities, patterns of life, and associations with which the model had been presented. At the time we began our analysis, no available data met our needs. Therefore, we created our own.
2.3.1 Simulating the non-threat background clutter. We designed and executed a Monte Carlo simulation to automatically and probabilistically generate the activities of thousands of non-threat individuals living and working in a city over multiple days. Each individual was randomly assigned to a different type of job (i.e., office worker, delivery driver, landscaper, and so forth). Table 2 lists the different types of jobs and the number of individuals generated for each job type. The individuals in each job type shared a set of baseline probabilities for their activities-as an example, see Table 3 for the baseline activity probabilities of office workers. Simulation time throughout the day increases from left to right in Table 3 . For any given office worker, the simulation first generated a random number and then compared the number to the probabilities listed in the Hr 0 column to determine which specific activity this specific individual was doing at midnight on Day One of the simulation. Since the probability of the activity ''deep sleep'' was 100% at Hr 0 and the duration of ''deep sleep'' was set to 1 hr, the simulation assigned ''deep sleep'' to the individual from midnight to 1 a.m. At the end of this activity, the simulation generated another random number and the process repeated until specific activities were assigned to the individual throughout the course of the simulation.
These activity probabilities varied with job type and time of day. For example, the probability of a landscaper digging in the ground at 10 a.m. was much higher than the probability of an office worker completing the same activity at the same time of day. Other conditional dependencies automatically and dynamically altered the baseline probabilities for a given individual at any given time step. For example, the probability of an individual getting dressed, eating breakfast, or participating in any other activity was 0% if he or she had not yet woken up that morning.
We generated our synthetic data on a map based on a real urban area. We downloaded a 10 km × 10 km map from OpenStreetMaps (http://www.openstreetmaps.org) and processed it to put the buildings and connecting road network into our graph format. We then randomly assigned building types (e.g., single family residences, stores, and so forth) to the buildings. A few critical buildings were given fixed locations. Routes between buildings were calculated using an A* search algorithm 13 and assumptions on different fixed speeds for different road types. Note that we made the simplification of a one-to-one correspondence between individuals and the vehicles they drove.
Specific buildings were probabilistically assigned to each individual as his or her residence, place of work, and preferred places of leisure, errands, and worship. These assignments were used to automatically and probabilistically determine where a particular activity would take place. For example, if the activity ''shop in open-air market'' was probabilistically assigned to an individual, then the probability that the activity would take place at one of his or her preferred markets was automatically set very high. Individuals were also assigned to particular friends and colleagues (i.e., other individuals). These assignments were used to determine activities in which two or more individuals were needed. For example, the probability that an individual would play soccer was dynamically increased if his or her friends were already playing soccer. Table 4 lists some activities generated for one of these non-threat individuals. The simulation started at Hr 0.0 (midnight on Day One), when the individual was asleep in location #3977. He woke up at Hr 7.1, took out the trash, got dressed, fixed breakfast and ate, and then at Hr 8.1 drove his car to location #4968, and so forth. These activities-and the activities of all other non-threat individuals generated by the Monte Carlo simulationconstituted our synthesized non-threat background clutter.
Simulating the threat.
We also created threatening objects and activities in our synthetic input data. In addition to the non-threat individuals, we also generated a much smaller number of threat individuals. Some of these threat individuals were designed as leaders, high-level operatives including commanders, the bomb maker, and so forth. The remaining threat individuals were designed as followers, low-level operatives such as lookouts, diggers, drivers, and so forth.
Threatening activities for these individuals were hardcoded into the synthetic data. These activities included planning, building, emplacing, and detonating two IEDs in the path of an allied military convoy. Each sequence of hard-coded threat activities had a probabilistic trigger activity. The hard-coding was enabled by conditions that raised certain activities' probabilities to 100% and drove the rest to 0%, forcing a particular activity to occur. When the threat individuals were not taking part in any of the threat-related activities, they belonged to a nonthreat job type and engaged in non-threat activitiessleeping, eating, working, playing soccer with friends, and so forth-all probabilistically generated by the Monte Carlo simulation.
Querying the output data
After running the synthesized input data through our endto-end model, we queried the model's output text reports (middle and right of Figure 3 ) to extract actionable intelligence. This process mirrors our envisioned concept of operations (CONOPS) for the users of the threat detection system in the selected scenario. Queries were initiated by a cue. The nature of this cue represented the largest difference between our forensic versus prospective exercises.
Cueing the forensic exercise.
In our forensic exercise, the cue took the form of the IED explosions. These explosions were hard-coded to take place within a particular time step of the simulation: shortly after Hr 33.3, within the 9 a.m. hour on Day Two. We envisioned that at Hr 34.0 of the simulation (10 a.m. on Day Two, less than an hour after the explosions), an intelligence analyst could begin using the threat detection system to accomplish her mission: identify the insurgents responsible for the IEDs. We envisioned the user querying the output text reports, as described in Table 5 . The first query was simple, asking for the number of sequenced individuals that the system could assemble from the text reports of detected activities and tracked objects. All but the last query could be answered in the absence of the social network, using only the text reports of sequenced individuals to identify a set of original suspects. In contrast, the last query required the use of the text reports of associations between sequenced individuals, built from the social network algorithm. This last query resulted in additional first-, second-, and thirddegree suspects, progressively more removed from the original cue. The purpose of our forensic exercise was to assess how well the user could query the system to correctly identify suspects after the explosions. Table 5 . Example user queries of the model's output text reports in response to the forensic cue. This set of queries was run once at Hr 34, less than an hour after the threat event. The numbers in the system response rows reflect a model run in which 200 vehicle types could be distinguished (N color = 200) in the hypothetical imagery and sequenced individuals were associated to the first degree if they shared two or more coincident locations (N loc = 2).
Cue
Two IED explosions were reported shortly after Hr 33.3, within the 9 a.m. hour on Day Two of the simulation. .and so forth. .and so forth.
Cueing the prospective exercise.
The cue in our prospective exercise was more subtle, since the explosions had not yet occurred. We envisioned that external intelligence was provided to the user via some other source of information independent of the WAMI threat detection system: a trusted eyewitness report of an individual on the suspected terrorist watch list entering a suspected safe house. We simulated this cue by manually flagging the report of a sequenced individual (corresponding to a true low-level follower of the IED cell) entering a location (corresponding to a true safe house) at Hr 7.8, shortly before 8 a.m. on Day One of the simulation. We then simulated the user's response to this cue by performing a set of queries on the output text reports, starting at Hr 8.0, 8 a.m. on Day One, minutes after receipt of the cue. The queries were repeated once every 2 hr up to and including Hr 32.0, 8 a.m. on Day Two, less than 1½ hr before the IED explosions. The purpose of our prospective exercise was to assess how well the user could query the system to identify suspects as far in advance as possible. Table 6 outlines the cue and repeated queries used in our prospective exercise.
Defining the overall value metrics
A scoring system was needed to determine which of the suspects did or did not correspond to true IED insurgents. Even the very first suspects in the forensic exercise-the sequenced individuals reported digging at the explosion sites in the recent past-may or may not have been related to the explosions. It is possible that some or even all of these first few suspects may have been landscapers who had simply been performing non-threatening activities in relation to their jobs. Although the user's query attempted to disregard such individuals, the system may or may not have been able to correctly discern which individuals were truly landscapers. Fortunately, the full ground truth in our synthetic data allowed the suspects to be scored. This ability to score the suspects enabled us to identify which of the true objects and activities input into the model were able to flow through each component of the model unscathed such that they could support the user's queries at the very end. We quantified the overall value of the system to the user for her counter-IED mission. For example, we assessed the modeled camera not simply based on how many different vehicle types could be distinguished in its hypothetical imagery, but, instead, on how much the camera contributed to accurate identification of the IED insurgents. Similarly, we assessed the social network algorithm not simply based on how many ''friends of friends'' of the original suspects were identified, but, instead, on how much the social network contributed to accurate identification of the IED insurgents. Thus, we considered the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) of the entire threat detection system as a whole, rather than merely considering the individual Measures of Performance (MOPs) of the camera alone, the social network algorithm alone, and so forth.
We defined two MOEs for our tradeoff analysis as follows.
• The number of true positives. True positives were defined as true IED insurgent individuals in our synthetic data who corresponded to sequenced individuals that were identified as suspects based on the user queries of the model's output text reports.
• The percent reduction in the number of false positives. False positives were defined as suspected sequenced individuals who did not correspond to a true IED insurgent individual. The percent reduction in false positives was calculated relative to the number of false positives that would occur in the extreme case in which all sequenced individuals were considered suspects.
Our two MOEs were similar to the probability of hit and one minus the probability of false alarm metrics often used to assess threat detection systems. We plotted the two MOEs against each other to form curves similar to Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. 14 Investigation of these ROC-like curves uncovered the value of the intelligence to the user for her counter-IED mission.
Results
We ran the Monte Carlo simulation once to generate one instantiation of the synthetic data. This synthetic data consisted of 544,846 activities performed over 46.5 hr by 4622 individuals (22 IED insurgents and 4600 non-threat background individuals) at 5444 buildings connected by a road network distributed across a 10 km × 10 km map. Of the 22 IED insurgents, eight were leaders and 14 were followers.
As indicated in the right-most column of Table 1 , we ran the Developing Components block of our model eight different times, each with a different value of N color (i.e., the number of types of vehicles observed at the same time and location that could be distinguished from each other in the hypothetical imagery): 7, 25, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, and 2000 vehicle types. The parameter P d (i.e., the probability of detecting activities) was set to 90% for most activities that were visible (i.e., that occurred outdoors) and to 0% for those activities that were not visible (i.e., that occurred indoors). The parameter P tto (i.e., the probability of tracking a vehicle through an obstruction) was set to 100% and P track (i.e., the overall probability of tracking a vehicle from one location to the next, including through obstructions) was set to 90%. This method created eight different instantiations of the text report dataset that was output by the Developing Components block depicted in Figure 3 (middle).
For each of these eight instantiations, we ran the Anticipated Components block of our model 12 different times. Each run used a different value of N loc (i.e., the number of coincident locations that two sequenced individuals must share to be identified as being associated to the first degree): two, three, four, and five coincident locations. Each run also used a different value of N deg (i.e., the number of degrees of association sought in the social network): one, two, and three degrees of association. This method created 8 × 12 = 96 different instantiations of the text report dataset that was output by the Anticipated Components block depicted in Figure 3 (right) .
We analyzed each of the 96 datasets two times, once forensically and again prospectively, to assess tradeoffs between different capabilities of the modeled system. The trends we observed are reported below, based on figures that plot subsets of the parameters in Table 1 
Better sensors led to fewer, longer sequences
One key tradeoff that we considered was the quality of the camera versus the characteristics of the patterns of life of the tracked objects. That is, we investigated how the quality of the camera (summarized by the N color parameter) affected the sequences of text reports that were output by the pattern of life algorithm. Similar trends were observed in the forensic and prospective exercises. Figure 4 plots the number and length of sequences assembled by the pattern of life algorithm versus N color for the forensic exercise. The length of the sequences is quantified as the mean number of locations visited by each sequenced individual. As the quality of the camera improved (toward the right of the horizontal axis), the text reports were assembled into fewer, longer sequences. Figure 5 shows similar trends for the prospective exercise. Results are plotted for three different simulation times, here listed in reverse chronological order:
Forensic exercise.
Prospective exercise.
• Hr 32.0 (8 a.m. on Day Two), the same morning as the explosions, less than 1½ hr beforehand; • Hr 22.0 (10 p.m. on Day One), the night before the explosions; and • Hr 12.0 (noon on Day One), the day before the explosions, only a few hours after receipt of the prospective cue.
At each simulation time, the trends are similar to the forensic exercise: better sensors led to fewer, longer sequences. Furthermore, holding the camera quality constant, additional trends can be seen by comparing results across simulation times. Both the number and length of sequences increased between Hrs 12 and 22 (from diamonds to triangles in Figure 5 ) after 10 additional daytime/evening hours of collecting data from individuals as they moved around the city and performed activities outdoors. In contrast, neither the number nor length of the sequences changed much between Hrs 22 and 32 (from triangles to squares) while most individuals slept indoors.
Better sensors led to more associations
Another key tradeoff in our analysis was the quality of the camera versus the characteristics of the social network constructed from the sequenced individuals. That is, we investigated how the quality of the camera (once again summarized by the N color parameter) affected the number of first-degree associations identified in the social network. Once again, similar trends were found in the forensic and prospective exercises. Figure 6 plots the number of firstdegree associations identified by the modeled system versus N color for the forensic exercise. Four different curves are shown, each referring to one value of the N loc parameter (the number of coincident locations that two sequenced individuals must share to be identified as being associated to the first degree). The association criteria became laxer as N loc was reduced. All four curves show the same trend: as the camera quality improved, the number of identified first-degree associations increased. Figure 7 shows similar trends for the prospective exercise. Results are plotted for three different simulation times. In each case, sequenced individuals identified as being associated to the first degree shared two or more coincident locations (N loc = 2). At each simulation time and for each value of N loc , the trends are similar to the forensic case: better sensors led to more identified first-degree associations.
Forensic exercise.
Prospective exercise.
Holding camera quality constant, additional trends can be seen by comparing results across simulation times in the prospective exercise. The number of identified first-degree associations increased between Hrs 12 and 22 (from diamonds to triangles in Figure 7 ) while most individuals moved around the city and came into contact with others. In contrast, the number of identified first-degree associations did not increase as much between Hrs 22 and 32 (from triangles to squares) while most individuals slept indoors.
Better sensors required less processing time to find the associations
A third tradeoff was the quality of the camera versus the processing time required to construct the social network. Nearly identical results were found for the forensic and prospective exercises. Figure 8 plots the central processing unit (CPU) time needed to identify all first-degree associations versus N color in our forensic exercise. Four different curves are shown, each referring to one value of N loc . All four curves are nearly identical, exhibiting the same trend: as the quality of the camera improved, the CPU time needed to identify the first-degree associations dropped dramatically. In fact, Figure 9 plots the CPU time versus the number of sequences squared, exhibiting a straight line. The black numbers note the camera qualities (i.e., N color values) of each data point. 
Forensic exercise.
Prospective exercise.
Nearly identical results (not shown here) were found for the prospective exercise, regardless of simulation time.
Better sensors did not always lead to better intelligence
Another tradeoff involved the quality of the camera versus the overall quality of the output intelligence, as quantified by the number of true positives and the percent reduction in false positives. Similar trends were seen in the forensic and prospective exercises. Two extreme points are plotted in each curve of Figure 10 . The dot in the upper left corner represents the hypothetical case in which all sequenced individuals were considered suspects (N deg ≈ Infinity). In such a case, all 22 true insurgents could be identified, at the cost of incurring the maximum possible number of false positives (the total number of sequenced individuals corresponding to true non-threat individuals), which, by definition, resulted in a 0% reduction in false positives. In contrast, the star in the upper right corner represents the goal of the threat detection system: identifying all 22 true insurgents but with zero false positives, resulting in a 100% reduction in false positives relative to the extreme case in which all sequenced individuals are considered suspects. The closer the results came to this starred goal, the better. In this way, each of these plots can be interpreted as a ROC curve flipped on the horizontal axis.
The middle curve of Figure 10 shows results for a moderate-quality camera, in which 200 vehicle types observed at the same time and location could be distinguished in the hypothetical imagery (N color = 200). Identifying higher degrees of association led to more true positives (moving upward toward the starred goal) but a smaller percent reduction in false positives (moving leftward away from the starred goal). The small dot halfway up the vertical axis on the right side of the plot corresponds to the original suspects, those identified via the second-to-last query in Table 5 . If only these original suspects were considered, then 11 of the 22 true insurgents could be identified, with an almost 100% (27,588 out of 27,611) reduction in false positives. That is, the user could identify half of the true insurgents while still correctly eliminating from suspicion almost all sequenced individuals corresponding to true non-threat individuals. Moving along the ROC-like curve, if the first-degree associates identified for the original suspects were also considered to be suspects, then two additional true IED insurgents could also be identified, again resulting in an almost 100% (27,492 out of 27,611) reduction in false positives. However, if up to third-degree associates were identified, then 21 of the 22 true insurgents could be identified but at the cost of many false positives (i.e., an 83% (22,828 out of 27,611) reduction in false positives, such that 17% of the sequenced individuals who corresponded to true nonthreat individuals were mistakenly identified as suspects).
The top curve of Figure 10 represents the poorest quality camera in our analysis, such that only seven different vehicle types observed at the same time and location could be distinguished (N color = 7). The original suspects led to the identification of eight of the 22 true IED insurgents, with a 100% (144,601 out of 144,601) reduction in false positives. All data points collapsed onto one dot, indicating that identifying the first-, second-, and third-degree associates of the original suspects did not lead to any value to the user for her mission beyond the original suspects.
In contrast, the bottom curve represents the results obtained from the highest quality camera in our analysis, such that 2000 different vehicle types observed at the same time and location could be distinguished (N color = 2000). In this case, identifying third-degree associates led to the identification of all 22 true insurgents, but with only a 55% (7140 out of 12,937) reduction in false positives (45% of all sequenced individuals corresponding to true non-threat individuals were mistakenly identified as suspects).
For each curve in Figure 10 , a circle surrounds the data point representing the third-degree associates identified for the original suspects. These data points represent the fullest extent of the intelligence contained in the output text reports, pulled from the most extensive social network considered in our analysis. Figure 11 replots these circled points (and those from the other camera qualities not shown in Figure 10 ) to form a summary ROC-like curve. A knee in the curve occurs at moderate-quality cameras (between N color = 100 and 200). Increasing the quality of the camera to distinguish from seven to 100 vehicle types steadily inched the system's value upward toward the starred goal, enabling the identification of almost twothirds of all true insurgents, with only a small increase in false positives (i.e., a small decrease in the percent reduction in false positives). At the knee in the curve, increasing the quality of the camera from 100 to 200 vehicle types led to a large increase in both true positives and false positives (i.e., a large decrease in the percent reduction in false positives). A different trend is exhibited after the knee. As the camera quality was further increased from 200 to 2000 vehicle types, there was not much more room for improvement in the upward direction, since only one true positive was left to identify. Yet, the false positive metric became markedly worse, pulling the curve farther sideways from the starred goal. Figure 11 . The number of true positives versus the percent reduction in false positives for different sensor qualities in the forensic exercise: replotting the circled third-degree points in Figure 10 to form a summary Receiver Operating Characteristic-like curve.
Prospective exercise.
Similar results were found for the prospective analysis. Figure 12 plots three sets of similar ROC-like curves to Figure 10 . In each plot, results are shown for three different simulation times when individuals associated to the first degree shared two or more coincident locations (N loc = 2). The trends at each simulation time are identical to the forensic case: for moderate-to high-quality cameras, considering higher degree suspects increased the number of true positives (closer upward toward the starred goal) but reduced the percent reduction in false positives (farther leftward from the starred goal).
We compared results across simulation times. For example, the middle plot of Figure 12 shows that when the camera was of a moderate quality such that 200 vehicle types could be distinguished in the hypothetical imagery (N color = 200), the intelligence showed limited value at Hr 12 (diamonds), only a few hours after receipt of the prospective cue. At Hr 12, the third-degree suspects identified six true insurgents, only three more than the original suspects, with a 96% (8514 out of 8904) reduction in false positives. The intelligence exhibited much more value at Hr 22 (triangles) the night before the explosions and several hours after receipt of the prospective cue. At this point in time, the third-degree suspects identified 20 of the 22 true insurgents, 12 more than the eight identified by the original suspects, albeit with only a 78% (18,189 out of 23,224) reduction in false positives. We note that the output text reports showed that the original suspect-the suspected terrorist reported entering the suspected safe house at Hr 7.8-was reported as returning to the safe house two more times as the simulation progressed through these hours, once at Hr 9.3 and again at Hr 20.6. Finally, we note that little additional value was exhibited at Hr 32 (squares), less than 1½ hr before the explosions. Figure 13 shows a set of summary ROC-like curves, replotting the points from Figure 12 that corresponded to third-degree suspects for each simulation time. The numbers indicate the camera qualities (i.e., N color values) for each data point at Hr 22 (triangles). Results for each of the three simulation times show a knee in the curves at moderate-quality cameras (between N color = 100 and 200)-the same camera qualities for which a knee in the curve was noted in the forensic exercise (see Figure 11) .
We also compared results across simulation times for our summary curves in Figure 13 . For very poor-quality cameras (N color = 7 and 25), the value of the intelligence did not improve much as the simulation progressed in time. That is, the two data points (corresponding to N color = 7 and 25) at the lower right ends of each of the three curves (corresponding to Hrs 12, 22, and 32) were all plotted very close to one another. In contrast, for low-tomoderate-quality cameras (N color = 50 and 100), time helped. That is, as the simulation progressed from Hrs 12 to 22 (from diamonds to triangles in Figure 13) , a large increase occurred in the number of true positives for the next two data points (corresponding to N color = 50 and 100), albeit with a decrease in the percent reduction in false positives. Furthermore, as the simulation progressed even further from Hrs 22 to 32 (from triangles to squares), a smaller increase continued to occur in the number of true positives, with only a small decrease continuing to occur in the percent reduction in false positives. Finally, for moderate-to-high-quality cameras (N color = 200, 500, 1000, and 2000), time helped only up to and including Hr 22 (triangles). No additional value (or cost) was gained overnight, between Hrs 22 and 32 (from triangles to squares).
Better sensors enabled the output intelligence to stabilize only slightly earlier than poorer sensors
In our final tradeoff, we examined the simulation time required to identify different types of threat individuals. Not all insurgents had been created equally in our synthetic data. We had explicitly created eight individuals who were leaders of the IED cell-commanders, the bomb maker, and so forth. The remaining 14 members of the IED cell had been explicitly created as followers-lookouts, diggers, drivers, and so forth. As shown in Table 5 , one of the first user queries in response to the forensic cue (the explosions) was to ask if any individuals had been reported digging at the explosion sites in the recent past, in an effort to quickly identify the low-level members of the IED cell (i.e., followers) who had been ordered to emplace the IED. Similarly, as shown in Table 6 , the prospective cue was a trusted eyewitness report of a suspected terrorist entering a suspected safe house. To make our analysis more challenging, we had deliberately ensured that this suspected terrorist was a low-level rather than high-level operative of the IED cell (i.e., a follower). However, we envisioned that in both the forensic and prospective cases, the user would be most concerned with identifying the high-value leaders of the IED cell, rather than the lowvalue followers. Figure 14 charts the number of true positive leaders and true positive followers versus simulation time for different quality cameras when the social network algorithm required two coincident locations to identify a first-degree association (N loc = 2). Also charted is the percent reduction in false positives versus simulation time. In an ideal case, all three measures would reach high values early in the simulation. In our prospective exercise, the cue (the trusted eyewitness report) occurred at Hr 7.8 (slightly before 8 a.m. on Day One of the simulation). The first set of prospective queries was run immediately afterwards, at Hr 8.
The upper right plot of Figure 14 represents results for a moderate-quality camera (N color = 200). Only one true follower was identified as a suspect (the suspected terrorist in the trusted eyewitness report) via the first prospective query at Hr 8. Zero true leaders were identified. Two hours later, the second set of prospective queries was run at Hr 10. One additional true positive was found-a leader. At Hr 12, a few more true followers were identified. The value of the intelligence stabilized at Hr 22. At this point in simulation time, 20 true positives were found (13 of the 14 followers and seven of the eight leaders), while the Figure 13 . The number of true positives versus the percent reduction in false positives for different sensor qualities in the prospective exercise: replotting the third-degree points in Figure 12 to form a summary Receiver Operating Characteristic-like curve.
number of false positives was reduced by 78% (18,189 out of 23,224). That is, all but one follower and one leader could be identified by Hr 22, the night before the explosions. In comparison, the forensic queries run at Hr 34, after the explosions had already occurred, resulted in 21 true positives (all 14 followers and seven of the eight Figure 14 . The number of true positive leaders, the number of true positive followers, and the percent reduction in false positives versus simulation time for different quality sensors in the prospective (before the event) and forensic (after the event) exercises. leaders), while reducing false positives by 83% (22,828 out of 27,611).
In contrast, the chart in the upper left corner of Figure 14 is based on the poorest quality camera in our analysis (N color = 7). In the prospective exercise, the modeled system did not provide any additional value beyond the one true follower identified via the first query at Hr 8. That is, once the cue was used to identify this original suspect, no additional true positives (neither leaders nor followers) were found before the explosions, regardless of simulation time. In the chart immediately below, a slightly higher quality camera (N color = 25) added only slightly more value as the simulation progressed in time, identifying an additional true leader at Hr 10 and an additional true follower at Hr 16. In fact, the system's value was able to steadily increase over time only when the camera was of a quality such that 50 or more vehicle types could be distinguished at the same time and location in the hypothetical imagery (N color = 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, and 2000). For these camera qualities, more and more true leaders and followers were flagged as the simulation progressed in time for the prospective exercise.
For all but the poorest quality cameras (N color = 7 and 25), better sensors allowed the output intelligence to stabilize only slightly earlier than poorer sensors. The intelligence enabled by the low-to-moderate-quality camera of 
Discussion
Interpretation of analysis
Several parameters were used in our end-to-end model. The parameter we considered most often was N color , the number of vehicle types observed at the same time and location that could be distinguished from each other in the hypothetical imagery. N color summarized the quality of the camera. A low N color indicated a poor-quality camera, while a high N color indicated a high-quality camera. The use of the N color parameter allowed us to summarize the overall effects of many different parameters used to assess real-world cameras, including the ground sample distance, frame rate, coverage, and so forth. It also allowed us to discuss our findings in unclassified forums, without needing to explicitly state which combination of these parameters corresponded to the different N color values.
Upon initial examination of the results of our analysis, higher quality cameras appeared to provide many benefits. Higher quality cameras did, indeed, allow the pattern of life algorithms to assemble tracked objects into fewer, longer sequences. As more vehicle types could be distinguished from each other at the same time and location, it became easier to sequence together text reports that appeared to be about the same vehicle, which resulted in longer sequences. These longer sequences then allowed the social network algorithm to identify more associations between sequenced individuals. The longer the sequence, the more locations it contained on average and the more likely two sequences could then meet the association criteria for sharing N loc or more coincident locations, leading to more identified first-degree associations. That is, while the associations identified by a higher quality camera better reflected the true associations contained in the synthetic input data, the associations identified by a poorquality camera did not reflect the true associations very well at all.
Furthermore, as more text reports of tracked objects were assembled into a sequence, the fewer reports were left over to form their own sequences, resulting in fewer sequences in total. This phenomenon meant that higher quality cameras also resulted in a shorter processing time to construct the social network. This was due to the fact that, in our model, identifying first-degree associations between sequences required each sequence to be compared with each other; therefore, the processing time required to identify all first-degree associations scaled with the number of sequences squared. In short, the better the camera, the fewer the sequences and the shorter the processing time required to identify first-degree associations between sequences.
We must note, though, that the number and length of sequences, the number of associations, and the time required to identify the associations are merely MOPs. These measures do not describe the overall value of the model's output intelligence to the user for her counter-IED mission. Due to the end-to-end nature of our model and the full ground truth available for our synthetic data, two MOEs could be defined that quantified the overall value of the model's output intelligence. The first MOE was the number of true positives, that is, the number of true insurgents that were correctly identified as suspects. The second MOE was the percent reduction in false positives, relative to the extreme case in which all sequenced individuals were considered suspects. More valuable intelligence was characterized by a large number of true positives and a large percent reduction in false positives, toward the upper right corner of our ROC-like curves.
Upon further examination of the results of our analysis, higher quality cameras did not always lead to more valuable intelligence, as measured by the true positive and false positive MOEs. In our forensic exercise, a poor-quality camera (N color = 7) enabled the identification of only eight of the 22 true insurgents, regardless of the strictness of the criterion for identifying first-degree associations (N loc ) or the number of degrees of association sought in the social network (N deg ). Increasing the quality of the camera to N color = 200 enabled the identification of 21 out of the 22 true insurgents, including all 14 followers and all but one of the eight leaders of the IED cell. The percent reduction in false positives was only 83%, though, meaning that 17% of all sequenced individuals were mistakenly identified as suspects. Furthermore, increasing the quality of the camera further, to N color = 2000, enabled the identification of all 22 true insurgents, but with the cost of only a 55% reduction in false positives-almost half of the sensed individuals were misidentified as suspects. Similar results were shown in our prospective exercise, at all simulation times.
As the simulation progressed in time through the daylight and evening hours of Day One, more, longer sequences could be assembled and more first-degree associations could be identified in our prospective exercise. This is due to the fact that most individuals performed activities outdoors and moved around the city during these hours, generating more reports that could be assembled into sequences and coming into contact with other sequences, such that associations could be identified. These identified associations proved useful for all but the poorest quality cameras (N color = 7 and 25), allowing the higher degree associations identified for the original suspects to accurately identify more and more true insurgents over time.
As the simulation progressed further through the night, however, the MOEs of the prospective exercise changed little. This is due to the fact that most individuals spent these hours sleeping indoors, unable to generate more text reports that could be assembled into sequences and unable to come into contact with other sequences, meaning that new associations could not be identified. As such, the intelligence resulting from the prospective queries did not increase in value throughout the night. In fact, for all camera qualities, the intelligence stabilized in the evening of Day One, the night before the explosions. In a real-world scenario, authorities would have had the opportunity the night before to further deal with the suspects in an effort to prevent any threat event from occurring in the future, especially if low-to-moderate-quality cameras were used (i.e., N color = 50 or 100) to limit the total number of suspects. We did not attempt to model how operatives could prioritize which of the suspects to question or apprehend first, since such an analysis would depend heavily upon the CONOPS, tactics, techniques and procedures, and rules of engagement of the mission.
In short, both our forensic and prospective exercises indicated that although better cameras led to more true positives at slightly earlier hours, better cameras also led to a smaller percent reduction in false positives, which resulted in the mistaken identification of more innocent individuals. The cost of mistakenly identifying innocent individuals must always be weighed against the cost of failing to identify a true insurgent. Users of threat detection systems must consider the relative costs between these two types of errors for each individual mission. In our analysis, if the user had decided that mistakenly identifying innocent individuals (false positives) was worse that failing to identify true insurgents (false negatives), then a low-to-moderate-quality camera (N color = 50) would have provided the most value to the user for her mission in our modeled scenario. That is, when only 50 different vehicle types could be distinguished at the same time and location, more than half of the true insurgents were correctly identified as suspects the night before the explosions, with almost a 100% reduction in false positives. On the other hand, had the user decided that false negatives were worse than false positives, then a moderate-quality camera (N color = 200) would have provided the most value. That is, when 200 different vehicle types could be distinguished at the same time and location, the hypothetical imagery was of sufficient quality to support the construction of a valuable social network. The third-degree suspects of the social network allowed all but one true leader to be correctly identified as a suspect the night before the explosions, albeit with only a 78% reduction in false positives. Regardless, beyond this point in camera quality, there was no longer much of a ''bang'' for our camera ''buck.'' As camera quality continued to improve past N color = 200, there was little room for improvement in true positives, while the false positive metric only got worse.
These results must be considered in light of the different parameters used to model our WAMI system. Although N color described the quality of the camera, N loc and N deg did not describe the quality of the social network algorithm, but rather its strictness and extensiveness. The quality of the social network algorithm was held constant, defined by the rules used to identify first-degree associations. In our model, two sequenced individuals were considered associated to the first degree if they shared N loc or more coincident locations. A coincident location was any location in which both sequenced individuals were reported at the same time, regardless as to what type of location it was or when the meeting occurred. As such, a meeting of two sequenced individuals at a crowded, openair market at 2 p.m. was weighted no differently than a meeting of two sequenced individuals in a deserted alley at 2 a.m. This behavior explains why many of the higher degree suspects were false positives; the first-degree associations on which they were based could have been due to mere chance.
We briefly experimented with more complex rules that weighted different types of locations at different times of the day to form higher quality first-degree associations among sequenced individuals. Preliminary results showed that these higher quality social network algorithms resulted in a larger percent reduction in false positives while maintaining the same number of true positives. Although not explored in this paper, it may be that in order to truly reap the benefits of extremely high-quality cameras, extremely high-quality exploitation algorithms must be developed, as well.
Regardless, holding the quality of the pattern of life and social network algorithms constant, the moderate camera quality of N color = 200 emerged as a ''sweet spot'' in our analysis. This type of ''sweet spot'' can very well occur in any scenario in which the value of the threat detection system is summarized by two MOEs, one MOE that quickly saturates at its best possible value (such as the number of true positives in our analysis) and another MOE that does not saturate nearly as quickly (such as the percent reduction in false positives in our analysis). In our analysis, the first MOE saturated quickly because the threat was limited in number and low in prevalence (i.e., only 22 of the 4622 synthesized individuals were truly insurgents).
Implications of analysis
• Utility of simple, highly-abstracted models. The datasets output by complex models may not always be easily manipulated due to their large sizes or other complexities. In such a case, simple, highly abstracted models can be created instead. We abstracted the WAMI camera system into a simple model that simulated the effects that the low-level activity detection and object tracking algorithms would have had on the imagery collected by the camera, without simulating the imagery itself. The output of our model was a dataset of text reports, much smaller and easier to manipulate than imagery.
• Utility of synthetic input data. Appropriate input data may not always be available for exercising a model. In such a case, input data can be synthesized instead. We synthesized ground-truthed data over a sufficiently large area and long duration in order to exercise our end-to-end model of a WAMI threat detection system. • Forensic versus prospective missions. Developers of threat detection systems may perceive a need to choose between system designs to support primarily forensic versus primarily prospective missions. Such a choice may not be needed. In our simulation, the same design tradeoffs occurred for both forensic and prospective missions.
• ''Sweet spots.'' In our analysis, we found that the highest quality camera did not provide the most value to the user for her mission, when holding the quality of the exploitation algorithms constant. Instead, a moderate-quality camera emerged as the ''sweet spot.'' System developers may choose to identify ''sweet spots'' in their own systems. These ''sweet spots'' may refer to the capabilities of sensors (as found in our analysis), of algorithms, or of other system components. Resources could be invested to develop a component such that it can achieve its ''sweet spot'' capability. Beyond that point, however, resources could be diverted toward the development of other components, or other entire systems, instead.
Limitations of analysis
The limitations to our analysis include the following.
• Sample size. We performed only one Monte Carlo analysis to automatically and probabilistically generate the activities of only one ensemble of 4600 non-threat background individuals. We also relied upon only one hard-coded script of threat activities of the 22 threat individuals. The entire analysis could be repeated a large number of times, creating a large number of ensembles of non-threat individuals peppered with the threat activities pulled from a large number of scripts. Results could be combined across all runs to generate error bars on each of the figures shown in this paper. Furthermore, the values of different parameters could be systematically varied across a large number of runs, such as the number of individuals in each job type, the number of buildings in the map, and so forth. Sensitivity analyses could be performed to determine which parameters assert the strongest influence on the overall value of the intelligence to the user. An early analysis with only one-10th as many non-threat individuals indicated that the ''sweet spot'' in the analysis remained at N color = 200. However, one may wish to explore whether that ''sweet spot'' is sensitive to other parameters governing the synthetic input data.
• Validation. The objects and activities that we synthesized as input data have not yet been validated against the objects and activities that take place in the types of real-world cities envisioned in the selected scenario. Furthermore, the performance of each component of the model has not yet been validated against its corresponding component in the real-world threat detection system envisioned in the selected scenario. A completed validation would allow system developers to feel more confident that the results output by the model operating on the synthetic data are similar to the results expected from the real-world system operating in a real-world city. For example, one aspect of our model that needs to be further explored is the validity of summarizing the quality of the camera with a single parameter, N color .
• Cost. Our tradeoff analysis did not include information about the dollar cost of each modeled component. As a result, the total cost of the modeled system was not compared against the overall value of the model's output intelligence to the user for her counter-IED mission. This cost information should include the cost of developing and manufacturing each component as well as the cost of maintaining the component and training users to operate the component. 15 Such information could be included as a third axis to the ROC-like curves shown in this paper.
• Additional analyses. We have discussed one particular tradeoff analysis for one particular threat detection system used in one particular military scenario: an airborne asset collecting, processing, exploiting, and disseminating WAMI imagery over a city in which insurgents are planning, building, emplacing, and detonating a set of IEDs. However, this type of analysis could be repeated for any threat detection system in any scenario, including those more salient to current military missions or homeland security.
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